“We’re now not an awesome energy. We are going to by no means be so once more,” declared Sir John Main on November 9, 2020 at Center Temple in London. An outspoken critic of Brexit – the UK’s exit from the European Union – the previous Conservative prime minister warned of a “brutal” future, which he blamed on the negotiating “failures” of the Conservative authorities of Boris Johnson: “Due to our bombast, our blustering, our threats and our inflexibility – our commerce might be much less worthwhile, our Treasury poorer, our jobs fewer, and our future much less affluent.” Moreover, Brexit elevated the “threat of breaking apart the UK by elevated assist for Scotland to depart the Union, and Northern Eire to unite with the South.” However moderately than ending on an entirely pessimistic notice, Main proposed a overseas coverage recalibration. “International Britain” – a coverage (slogan) launched by Johnson’s predecessor, Theresa Could – was a good suggestion, assuming, he stated, “we” forswear the fantasy of “British exceptionalism.”
What is that this fantasy about, and the place does it come from? In line with students resembling Oliver Daddow, British exceptionalism emerged on the finish of the Napoleonic Wars, when Britain’s elites opted for a coverage of “restricted legal responsibility” to Europe as a method of liberating up sources for empire-building and free commerce. To garner assist for this coverage, they constructed and sustained varied “island tales.” Their ethical, nevertheless, was at all times the identical: “we” usually are not, and couldn’t probably be, “simply” one other European nation. Some members of stated elite have been in reality moderately particular: not “a Spain” (Sir Oswald Mosely, at varied factors within the interwar interval), not “one other Netherlands” (Harold Macmillan, talking as Chancellor of the Exchequer through the Suez Disaster), not “one other Belgium” (various politicians, from Lord Curzon in 1908 to the present period), and never “form of poor man’s Sweden” (the governor of Aden Sir Charles Johnston in 1963). The exception to show the rule was France, in fact as long as it managed to maintain its nice energy bona fides. Right here is Sir Malcolm Rifkind, writing in 2010: “The query for the UK and its Conservative led Authorities is whether or not it needs to retain a worldwide strategy, or resign itself to the lesser standing. Is it nonetheless ready to behave like France, or is it content material to have affect comparable with that of Spain?”
One of the influential island tales of all time – a minimum of in overseas coverage – is related to Winston Churchill. “We,” he declared on the 1948 Conservative Celebration convention in Llandudno, are the essential hyperlink between the “three nice circles among the many free nations and democracies.” By which he meant “the British Commonwealth and Empire,” “the English-speaking world,” and “United Europe” – in that particular order. Churchill then added: “We stand, in reality, on the very level of junction, and right here on this Island on the centre of the seaways and maybe of the airways additionally, we’ve got the chance of becoming a member of all of them collectively.”
Twenty years later, because the winds of decolonization blew into British lives and French President Charles de Gaulle twice vetoed the UK’s bid to hitch the Frequent Market, this and related tales needed to be revised. But, most revisions have been minor, such that exceptionalist beliefs continued. Going again to Daddow, the “flip to Europe” by no means compelled the ruling elites to advertise a extra European discourse of nationwide id. Quite the opposite, most if not all of them got here to study from Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherites that “Euroscepticism” is a know-how of rule, not a political stance. This growth, Daddow goes on to recommend, can assist us perceive the run up and end result of the 2016 referendum: “Asking the folks to simply accept the logic of Eurosceptic discourse however vote to Stay was an odd contract: some would possibly say counter-intuitive bordering on the illogical.”
Implicit on this stylized historical past is a conception of nationwide politics by which elites challenge particular concepts concerning the nation onto the “plenty.” My analysis on British exceptionalism, in distinction, began from a premise that nationwide identities and identifications are constituted by way of intersubjective, culturally rooted, “on a regular basis” meaning-making processes that contain civil society extra broadly. On this view, exceptionalist notions have strongest political penalties once they change into nationwide “frequent sense”, that’s, when they’re discursively formulated as such not solely amongst elites, but in addition “vertically,” which means between elites and much.
To get at British exceptionalism this manner, I led a workforce of discourse analysts who helped me learn political speeches, newspapers, highschool historical past textbooks, novels and flicks, our eyes skilled on all phrases that invoked “Britishness,” “Englishness,” and all that. We did so in six ten-year intervals, from 1950 to 2010, after which for good measure additionally within the 12 months 2015, thus evaluating and contrasting findings from throughout the colonial, Chilly Conflict, post-Chilly Conflict, and pre-Brexit vote contexts. Nonetheless, moderately than masking “4 nations,” we remained targeted on England, the first justification being England’s centrality for the structure and id formation of the so-called “nationwide UK.”
Right here I can report just some findings of relevance. The primary one is that there was no single, overwhelming, exceptionalist discourse, however that components of exceptionalism permeated an entire vary of English/British concepts of who they’re, have been, or want to change into. “Europe” was “over there,” way more distant than “America,” and for that matter the remainder of the English-speaking world, to make use of Churchill’s parlance. Subsequent, whereas elite and much alike often agreed that their nation was in decline – this was most evident in 1980, adopted by the years 1970 and 2010 – only a few texts in the whole archive rejected the thought of world energy. This was in reality constantly one of the crucial necessary methods folks understood what it meant to be British. In actual fact, regardless of the context, on a regular basis discourses of Britishness tended to place “Britain” as in some way distinctive.
If that is proper, then “nationwide id” might be one more reason why successive governments in London stayed the course on a worldwide nice energy overseas coverage. Solely two prime ministers rely as doable exceptions. One is Edward “Ted” Heath, a Tory prime minister from 1970 to 1974, finest identified, along with his “pro-Europe” views, for his working-class origins, idiosyncratic views, and declaring a report 5 states of emergency. The opposite is Harry Perkins, the fictional protagonist of A Very British Coup, a beloved 1982 novel by (now retired) Labour Left politician Chris Mullin. The adjective “doable” is essential, nevertheless. Heath, as each students and his contemporaries wish to level out, had no intention of ever pursuing a “smaller” overseas coverage. As for Perkins, a working-class Socialist whom some up to date readings have in comparison with Labour’s former chief Jeremy Corbyn, he merely by no means stood an opportunity. Certainly, his radical overseas coverage concepts – withdraw from NATO, discontinue Trident, chuck out the American bases – is why he will get toppled within the eponymous coup.
Will Brexit usher in a much less formidable overseas coverage, although? The reply in Mullin’s sequel novel, The Pals of Harry Perkins, is “perhaps”. Printed in 2019, the e book picks up the unique plot and takes it into the post-Brexit 2020s, when the UK is grappling with numerous issues. America is sending a fleet to combat China in assist of Japan. Germany, with India’s assist, is able to take the UK’s United Nations Safety Council seat. With the financial system “going from unhealthy to worse” – and the soiled politics of scapegoating changing into increasingly tiresome – the British voters are starting to search for new choices: a Labour prime minister and a “Brexit reversal”.
In the meanwhile, nevertheless, the UK’s precise management stays intensely dedicated to a worldwide strategy. A mere ten days after Main’s Center Temple speech, Prime Minister Johnson made an announcement within the Home of Commons asserting the biggest army spending increase for the reason that Chilly Conflict. The assertion could be learn as an impressive instance of what Main calls “our bombast, our blustering.” In it, Johnson invokes “world affect” twice, vows “to finish the period of retreat,” and likens his price range enhance to among the most well-known overseas coverage selections made by Churchill and Thatcher, in addition to Labour’s Clement Attlee. “In every case, Britain tipped the scales of historical past and did immense good for the world. Now we’ve got an opportunity to observe on this nice custom.” All this and extra, with out as soon as mentioning both “last” Brexit talks or the UK’s post-Covid funds.
Studying Main’s and Johnson’s speeches aspect by aspect is much more revelatory. Right here is one other quote from the previous: “If we can not once more be an awesome energy, we is usually a nice instance. If we can not compel, we will affect. We will construct up our comfortable energy to maintain our profile…” Prima facie, this can be a disagreement: in distinction to Johnson, Main desires to see a Britain that prioritizes management by instance over that muscle. But this disagreement is over ways, not technique, for each audio system are finally within the thought and apply of world affect. On a extra elementary stage, then, Main’s just isn’t a lot a repudiation of British exceptionalism as it’s its mainstream expression. So mainstream, in reality, that we must always anticipate to see extra of it even within the making an attempt months forward.
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