I thank Steve for his clarification under about his idea of why Trump might need a First Modification protection within the New York case. As I perceive it, Steve’s argument could be understood as being concerning the phrase “one other crime” in New York Penal Regulation 17.50:
An individual is responsible of falsifying enterprise information within the first diploma when he commits the crime of falsifying enterprise information within the second diploma, and when his intent to defraud consists of an intent to commit one other crime or to assist or conceal the fee thereof.
Steve’s argument is that the component of concealing the fee of “one other crime” has to seek advice from an act that does not simply fulfill the weather of a prison statute, however that, interpreted independently, is against the law that satisfies impartial First Modification evaluation. And so he argues that, if the jury identifies these parts of one other prison regulation as having been glad, that isn’t “one other crime” if there can be a First Modification protection to legal responsibility for these parts independently — both underneath present regulation, or, if wanted, on a greater understanding of regulation as modified by the Supreme Court docket on attraction from Trump’s conviction by overturning the Court docket’s precedent.
That is an fascinating argument, and I confess it isn’t what I assumed Steve was arguing in his first publish. So I actually admire the clarification, and I apologize to Steve for the misunderstanding. One thought I’ve in response is that there is a fairly fascinating interpretive query raised by Steve’s argument. When the New York legislature makes use of the phrase “one other crime” as a part of a component, does “one other crime” imply the weather of another prison regulation, or is “one other crime” extra of an impartial constitutional idea which means the weather of another prison regulation solely to the extent that the weather might be a free-standing prison offense with out violating the Structure?
I take it Steve believes the latter. That may be proper. However I am not completely certain about that. Off the highest of my head, I’d assume it is a query of statutory interpretation relatively than the constitutional regulation of parts of crimes. Offenses should fulfill the First Modification as an entire, clearly, however I do not assume there’s a constitutional drawback with a specific component of against the law involving First Modification protected actions. For instance, if a legislature says that it is a crime to punch somebody throughout a protest, the truth that the protest is protected by the First Modification does not imply that punching somebody throughout a protest can be. If I am proper about that, then I’d assume this finally ends up an fascinating query of statutory interpretation assuming that Steve is correct concerning the First Modification problem (both underneath present regulation or doable future regulation).
I poked round on Westlaw briefly to see if I may discover New York circumstances on this query, however I did not come throughout something helpful. It is a laborious query to analysis, because the related phrases find yourself mentioning plenty of unrelated circumstances. However thanks once more to Steve for the clarification, and I might have an interest to know if others make extra headway on the statutory query than I did.