“We scorned them,” Zvi Zamir as soon as said. He was the chief of the Israeli international intelligence service, Mossad, from 1968 to 1974 and was explaining the mindset that contributed to the foremost intelligence failure that allowed for the shock assault that started the October 1973 conflict between Arab states and Israel.
On the time, Zamir wasn’t alone in “scorning” Arabs. Main Basic Eli Zeira, the top of Israel’s Navy Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) throughout the 1973 conflict, reportedly additionally had “utter contempt for the combating qualities of the Arab armies”.
This “scorn” and “contempt” and the resultant intelligence failures value Israel 2,656 lifeless, greater than 7,250 wounded and, in the end, the Sinai Peninsula. In addition they value Zeira his job.
Historical past doesn’t at all times repeat itself. However on this case, it did – each the tragedy and the farce that led to it.
“We failed in our most necessary mission, and because the head of the Navy Intelligence Directorate, I bear full duty for the failure,” Zeira’s successor Main Basic Aharon Haliva mentioned on April 22, about 50 years after the October conflict, as he introduced his resignation.
AMAN’s spymaster – who beforehand argued for the stabilisation of the Palestinian authorities, the enhancement of Gaza’s financial prospects and the intensification of surgical strikes towards Palestinian resistance – admitted that he had underestimated the capabilities of the Qassam Brigades (QB), the armed wing of Hamas.
Regardless of having detailed details about QB’s battle plans, operational preparations and early warning indicators, Haliva ordered his subordinates “to attend for the morning” on the night time of October 6.
What was missed?
On October 7, the armed wing of Hamas executed an unprecedented, multidomain, combined-arms offensive manoeuvre adopted by a collection of atrocities within the “Gaza Envelope”, the Israeli areas close to the border with Gaza.
QB and its allies executed a textbook breaching operation, storming Israel’s “iron wall”. The organisation managed to suppress and overwhelm Israeli air defences with unguided rocket artillery. Concurrently, QB blinded Israeli surveillance and reconnaissance belongings and obscured its fighters’ breach factors and advance routes with a mixture of armed business drones and sniper hearth. QB didn’t safe its breaching factors within the Israeli barrier. Therefore, different organisations and armed civilians adopted the QB items into Israel, multiplying the dimensions of the attacking drive.
AMAN underneath Haliva had missed the early warning indicators of that simultaneous, five-domain, brigade-sized assault carried out from the land by a QB regiment-sized mild and motorised infantry formation; from the ocean by two platoon-sized naval infantry forces; and by way of air by a company-sized unit of paragliders. The assaults concerned electromagnetic and intelligence/info operations as effectively. The dimensions of coordination, spanning a number of platoon- and company-sized items, highlighted a classy stage of operability throughout varied domains of warfare. Such complexity in synchronization is arduous, demanding intensive coaching in command, management and each intra- and interunit communications. These preparations are prone to have taken greater than two years.
Why was it missed?
To be honest, damaged intelligence cycles – that’s the cycle of route, assortment, processing, evaluation, dissemination, suggestions and choice – are extra frequent than nonspecialists would consider.
Intelligence failures are seldom because of an absence of data. They don’t usually happen within the assortment and the processing a part of the cycle. For instance, United States naval and air belongings noticed, struck and sank a Japanese submarine on the morning of December 7, 1941, 90 minutes earlier than the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii was bombed by air.
Equally, in October 1973, days earlier than the shock assault, Israeli intelligence acquired exact particulars about an impending Egyptian offensive from a high-value supply. But Israel was nonetheless blindsided on October 6.
This sample of intelligence cycle breakdowns was additionally evident throughout the 9/11 assaults when, regardless of having detailed intelligence on al-Qaeda’s intentions, US safety establishments failed within the efficient dissemination and decision-making components of the cycle.
Earlier than Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US and United Kingdom intelligence communities not solely shared with governments but in addition publicly disclosed info on imminent Russian motion and mobilisation in Belarus. Regardless of this, Ukrainian analysts and decision-makers maintained a perception that the Russian army build-up on the Belarusian border was merely a feint, designed to anchor and repair Ukrainian forces within the north and the centre whereas anticipating the principle thrust to originate from the east and south. This miscalculation left Kyiv perilously unprepared.
In Israel final yr, the lapses within the intelligence cycle had been starkly evident because the summer time. In July, analysts from Unit 8200, Israel’s elite indicators intelligence unit, recognized and reported vital indicators of an impending large-scale operation by QB. The evaluation highlighted that QB had engaged in intensive coaching workouts that intently mirrored the ways detailed in a 40-page battle plan that AMAN had intercepted greater than a yr earlier than the October assaults. Regardless of the readability of those findings, the evaluation and subsequent suggestions have been dismissed as “imaginative” by senior officers throughout the army intelligence hierarchy.
Navy and political implications
Intelligence failures usually precipitate dire penalties, prompting a rigorous scrutiny of accountability measures. Politically, the Israeli prime minister holds the final word govt authority and is answerable for the general nationwide safety coverage. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is usually briefed by Haliva together with Yoav Gallant, the defence minister, and Herzi Halevi, the chief of the Basic Workers. The resignation of Haliva serves as a poignant admonition, suggesting that Netanyahu too ought to assume duty for the oversight and think about stepping down. Nonetheless, such a prospect stays uncertain.
Israeli political dynamics are more and more mirroring these of Arab regimes, the place authoritarian rulers seldom resign after catastrophic failures, as a substitute clinging tougher to energy. In such contexts, elimination, revolution or “suicide” are rather more frequent exits than resignations.
Militarily, Haliva’s resignation is unlikely to have an effect on, as some have instructed, the seemingly imminent floor offensive on Rafah. Each the drive deployment and statements of the army are signalling that the launch of that offensive is a matter of time. Preparations for an offensive are clearly underneath approach with at the least six mechanised infantry and armoured common brigades poised for motion in Rafah, supported by air, naval and artillery items.
AMAN has indicated that QB has at the least 4 battalion-sized formations in Rafah. Allegedly, that is along with the remaining captives held in Gaza and the management of Hamas in addition to intensive tunnel networks close to and underneath the Philadelphi Hall, the Gaza-Egypt border space.
Ought to AMAN’s assessments show inaccurate as soon as once more, the implications could possibly be catastrophic for greater than 1,000,000 internally displaced Palestinians sheltering in Rafah in addition to Israel and its leaders.
The views expressed on this article are the creator’s personal and don’t essentially replicate Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.