The Indonesian authorities has formally banned the hardline Islamic Defenders Entrance (Entrance Pembela Islam, FPI) via a joint ministerial decree (SKB) on 30 December 2020. It lists six causes for the ban. Amongst them is that FPI has no authorized grounds to function as a civil group, and plenty of of its members have been concerned in terrorism, unlawful raids, and different violent actions.
On December 12, 2020, the police detained Habib Rizieq Syihab, the chief of the FPI. He was charged with violating COVID-19 well being protocols at his daughter’s marriage ceremony occasion and a celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday. The occasions drew massive crowds, following Rizieq’s homecoming after three years in exile in Saudi Arabia. 5 different FPI members have been additionally named suspects on this case, together with the FPI common chairman, Sabri Lubis.
Habib Rizieq surrendered to the police a couple of days after six FPI members have been shot useless by the police who have been allegedly investigating the COVID-19 violations. The incident leaves many unanswered questions. The police and the FPI have their very own variations. The police declare that the taking pictures was carried out in self-defence as a result of the six FPI members attacked first with firearms and sharp weapons. The FPI declare that they have been massacred by the police and deny that they’d weapons. This incident continues to be beneath investigation as a result of issues that these could have been extrajudicial executions.
The occasions of the previous month signify how the federal government has turn out to be more and more repressive in dealing with Islamist teams thought-about a risk to the Indonesian state. Many Indonesians are proud of and admire the federal government’s transfer, even those that declare to be pluralist and progressive. The actions, nonetheless, will intensify grievances in opposition to the federal government. Fairly aside from the query of whether or not the federal government’s repressive measures undermine democracy, it’s not but clear whether or not the crackdown demonstrates the powerlessness of Islamists, notably the 212 motion, or whether or not it serves as a brand new, unifying concern in a manner that might have ramifications for the subsequent spherical of elections in 2024.
Habib Rizieq and the 212 Motion
The 212 motion, also called “Motion to Defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam)”, was born out of the two December 2016 mobilisation of lots of of 1000’s of Muslims within the streets of Jakarta to protest in opposition to Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), former Jakarta governor whom the organisers accused of blasphemy. They included the conservative-traditionalist FPI, the Salafi-modernist community of the Indonesian Council of Younger Intellectuals and Ulama (MIUMI, Majelis Intelektual dan Ulama Muda Indonesia), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the Discussion board of Islamic Society (Discussion board Umat Islam, FUI), and a few Islamic examine teams (majelis taklim).
To commemorate the anti-Ahok mobilisation, an annual reunion has been held on 2 December, on the Nationwide Monument (Monas) in Jakarta. The reunion in 2018 nonetheless attracted an enormous crowd, however the numbers started to say no in 2019. The 212 motion by then was in disarray. Not solely have been there inner frictions, however the motion had misplaced each its authentic purpose for unity (the blasphemy case), and its essential political patron, Prabowo Subianto, rival of President Jokowi within the 2019 election, who later joined Jokowi’s second-term cupboard as Defence Minister.
Habib Rizieq was a key determine within the 212 motion from the start. The 212 rallies arguably made him and his group, FPI, much more vital and fashionable. Rizieq’s return to Indonesia, due to this fact, initially raised hopes that the 2020 reunion might entice way more attendees and reconsolidate the motion amid the altering political panorama.
Nevertheless, as a result of COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government prohibited the 2020 212 reunion rally. Consequently, the 212 Alumni Brotherhood (the institutional consultant of the 212 motion) held a web-based occasion entitled “Nationwide Dialogue of 100 Ulamas and Figures”, broadcast reside on FPI’s YouTube channel: Entrance TV. The individuals have been distinguished figures, supporters, and sympathisers of the 212-movement alliance, such because the MIUMI chairman Bachtiar Nasir, the Salafi Wahdah Islamiyah chairman Zaitun Rasmin, HTI preacher Felix Siauw, and a few politicians. That recommended a reconsolidation was within the works, utilizing Rizieq’s name for “ethical revolution (revolusi akhlaq)” as a catch-all phrase to criticise the Jokowi authorities. If the Islamists might agree on little else, they might agree that Jokowi’s authorities was unfair and despotic.
In the course of the occasion celebrating the Prophet’s birthday in Petamburan, Jakarta, on December 14, 2020, Habib Rizieq conveyed 5 core factors of the Jokowi authorities which he meant to battle along with his ethical revolution: [1] efforts to secularise the state governance; [2] criminalisation of ulamas and figures opposing the federal government; [3] safety for blasphemers; [4] the controversial Omnibus Legislation; [5] the oligarchy that guidelines the economic system.
The substance of the revolusi akhlaq was, actually, just like the narratives that Habib Rizieq and FPI voiced throughout the 212 rallies, similar to “NKRI Bersyariah (the sharia-based Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia)”, “ayat suci di atas ayat konstitusi” (the holy verses above constitutional articles), and different phrases that mirror the agenda of Islamic supremacy. Whereas the slogan of “revolusi akhlaq” has little potential in consolidating the Islamist alliance of the 212 motion, I contend it’s the authorities’s current remedy of Habib Rizieq and the FPI that might empower this motion.
Authorities Response and Islamist Militancy
Research on democracy and Islamist actions in Indonesia display that the Jokowi authorities is more and more utilizing repressive measures to suppress Islamist opposition—a coverage path that Greg Fealy calls “repressive pluralism”. That is achieved by implementing a complicated anti-radicalism coverage, more and more reliant on the army and police, and which includes marginalisation and generally criminalisation of anybody suspected of (broadly outlined) radical views and favouritism in direction of average teams like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The federal government’s response to what has occurred since Rizieq’s return ought to be seen on this context.
For instance, the army was concerned in taking down billboards displaying Habib Rizieq’s image, that had been erected by his supporters in Jakarta. The police threatened to cost anybody claiming that the six males killed didn’t carry sharp weapons and firearms. The chairman of the North Sumatra FPI was arrested for defaming President Jokowi and Megawati (Indonesia’s fifth president and chairman of PDIP). Extra importantly, by arresting Habib Rizieq and banning FPI, the federal government more and more reveals aggressive attitudes in dealing with Islamists.
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As well as, it’s troublesome not assume that Habib Rizieq’s current arrest is political. Actually, there have been many different instances of violations of the COVID-19 well being protocol, similar to throughout the 2020 regional election campaigns, which have gone unpunished. This means that the protocols are being utilized by the federal government as a instrument to restrict the actions of Islamist teams.
Habib Rizieq appears to have stored management of his supporters and up to now prevented a backlash, but the anger in opposition to the federal government from a large spectrum of Islamist teams is rising. A wave of mass protests emerged in lots of areas throughout Java and Madura, demanding justice for the deaths of the six FPI members and the discharge of Habib Rizieq. This was then adopted by an try and organise a protest rally on 18 December, to be referred to as the “1812 motion” organized by FPI, the 212 Alumni Brotherhood, and their allies in central Jakarta. However the police prevented it on the grounds that it might result in a brand new cluster of COVID-19 transmission.
The 212 Alumni Brotherhood has pinned the title of “hero and martyr (syuhada) of revolusi akhlaq” to the six FPI males killed. Many Islamist teams throughout the alliance of the 212 motion, similar to MIUMI, HTI, and a few Salafi teams, imagine that they’re martyrs who defended Islam. This perception displays what Marx Jurgensmayer calls “cosmic battle”, which means the Islamists are struggling in “a non secular state of affairs” in opposition to the federal government they imagine marginalises Muslims. This additional supplies a moral-religious justification for them to more and more oppose the ruling authorities.
The federal government’s aggressive response could prohibit political house within the short-term for Islamists, however within the long-term it could possibly be counter-productive for the state, strengthening Islamist militancy, and perpetuating the Indonesian proverb about “a hearth within the rice husks” that may explode at any time. It offers the Islamists a brand new concern to rally round, highly effective new grievances in opposition to the federal government and an environment to revive their motion’s solidarity forward of the 2024 presidential election.